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Acronyms
• Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
• Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)
• Electronic Design Automation (EDA)
• Framework for Assessing Security and Trust in MicroElectronics (FASTIME)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust
• Intellectual Property (IP)
• Information Technology (IT)
• Input/Output (I/O)
• Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP)
• Physical unclonable function (PUF)
• Register Transfer Language (RTL)
• Verification and Validation (V&V)
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Synopsis of Assurance Plan
• The government is developing a systematic framework for practicing 
security and trust in ASIC and FPGA applications.
• Goal: User is provided guidance in mitigation best practices; 
correspondingly, missions are expected to follow guidelines to the best of 
their abilities; and a risk assessment is performed on implementation.
• There are three flows:
– (1) FPGA designer flow; (2) Designer ASIC flow; and (3) FPGA supplier flow.
– Separate with unique assurance approaches yet many similarities.
– We will discuss high-level generalities.
• Activity and Support:
– Government process established under Defense Production Act Title III
– Process is currently targeting a critical mission’s FPGA designer flow 
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ASIC: Application specific integrated circuit FPGA: Field programmable gate array
The methodology incorporates work/research performed by a variety of groups: NASA, The Aerospace Corporation, 
RAMBUS, Global Foundries, Mentor Graphics, Synopsys, Xilinx, Graf Research, Sandia National Laboratories, and Microsemi.
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Government Microelectronics Assessment for Trust: 
GOMAT
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Guideline 
Documents
Review
Process
Threat Matrix
RISK ASSESSMENT
Product 
Requirements
GOAL
Framework for Assessing 
Security and Trust In 
MicroElectronics
(FASTIME)
ASIC/FPGA Trust 
Assessment 
(AFTA)
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Modeling threats, vulnerabilities and mitigation helps to 
develop a framework for gathering system information. 
Visual direction for system evaluation.  
Game Theory:
• Jonathan Graf(Graf 
Research)
• Brandon Eames (Sandia 
National Laboratories)
Reliability and Radiation:
• NASA Model Based 
Mission Assurance 
(MBMA)
• NASA Head Quarters, 
NASA Electronic Parts 
and Packaging , and 
Vanderbilt University.
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Primary Design Cycle Vulnerabilities
Access
zAcquisition
Design Data Base
EDA tools Electronics/IT
Mostly External threats 
except for Personnel 
making acquisitions.
External or internal threats.
Design Cycle Preparation Design Cycle and Deployment
EDA Tools IP Cores
Personnel
Electronics/IT
Information
Personnel
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Example: Gap in acquisition mitigation can access 
design environment
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Mitigation Is Never 100% Bulletproof
• Adversary learns the system under 
analysis including mitigation.
• Adversary tries to detect or create 
gaps in mitigation.
• Adversary attacks system via gap.
• Must be taken into account in risk 
analysis.
• Do additional layers or dynamic layers 
of mitigation need to be 
implemented?
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Goal is to make the likelihood to adversary infiltration take longer than a 
component is active.
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Gaps in Mitigation:
Channels of Vulnerability and Circumstances 
Access
Acquisition
Learn/spy
Block Corrupt
Steal
Destroy/Loss of operation
Block
Destroy/Loss of operation
Blind
Different mitigation strategies are required 
(depending on vulnerability) when 
differentiating threat via access points or 
acquisition.
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Accessibility into Internal Design Elements: Multiple Layers 
of Mitigation (Codependency)
Data 
Storage
Data 
Handling
Personnel
RTL
EDA Tools
Gate level 
net-list
Bit stream
Acquisition also contains paths to these design 
elements.
Access
Actor has broken through initial  Access 
mitigation. IP 
Parametrics: 
power area temp
I/O
Fault 
Mitigation
Memory
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MASK
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Note Mitigation Application and Strength Must Be 
Carefully Assessed
• Piling on mitigation can add risk.
• Mitigation complexity might have hidden 
modes that are blind to the review team or 
unreachable by the EDA tools:
– System lock out,
– Unwarranted self-destruct,
– Flags that ease adversary’s learning 
phase.
Access
Mitigation eats access to 
all!!!!!!!!!!!!!
When Mitigation becomes a threat!
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Proposed Security and Trust Assessment Process: 
GOMAT
Increasing V&V is not a sufficient solution– it’s about employing threat 
mitigation, assessing mitigation, and finding potential gaps (that exist in 
the mitigation and V&V coverage).
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What was 
implemented?
Distinct Difference Between User and Assessor 
Responsibilities
User flow Assessor flow
Action V&V
How well was it 
implemented?
Was it verified?
Requirements 
covered?
Reliability 
considerations.
Functional 
considerations.
How well was it 
verified?
• User: Obtain requirements and guidelines.  
Implement and verify.
• Assessor: Identify known vulnerabilities.  
Predict potential vulnerabilities
FPGA/ASIC design FPGA supplier Assessment team
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User Flow versus Assessor Flow
User flow Assessor flow
Gather information
Categorize User Flow
Assess Implementation
Assess V&V
Compile Assessments
Acquisitions
Environment
Design
Deployment
V&V?
V&V?
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General Assessor Considerations and Goals
User flow Assessor flow
Action V&V Assessment
• Does design implementation need to be improved?
• Does verification coverage need to be increased?
• Do additional restrictions need to be applied?
• Have loose control compromised the product?
Identify known vulnerabilities
Predict potential vulnerabilities
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FASTIME: Review Process
15
• Creates visibility and traceability for 
each step of the design process and 
potential contribution to threat.
• Requires an external assessment team.
• For the manufacturer’s design process 
evaluation, it is unlikely that the trust 
and security assessment team will have 
access to all files to perform V&V.
• Hence, detailed checks of the 
manufacturer’s V&V coverage and 
mitigation processes are expected to be 
performed by the assessment team.
• Employs established “checklist” 
approach. 
• Enables risk analysis because of 
detailed information gathering.
Does not restrict EDA tools.  However 
assesses coverage.
Guideline 
Documents
Review 
Process
Threat Matrix
V&V: Verification and Validation
EDA: Electronic design automation
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Conventional User Review Process: FPGA Specific 
Path and Checklist
• FPGA Checklist is created to direct designers
(best practices).
• FPGA Checklist is used by the design review 
team to assess the following:
– Reliability of design practice (How well does the 
design follow design rules).
– Coverage of verification (how well does the design 
meet system FPGA requirements).
• Requirements list/test matrix.
• Specification documentation.
Best Practices and 
Requirements
FPGA Design Checklist
FPGA Specific
Checklist is used to assess how well the design and verification was 
implemented.  It does not contain mission specifics.  However, it points to a 
requirements matrix and assesses requirements coverage/fulfillment.
Controlled document
2 players
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NASA Procedures and Guidelines
• 300-PG-8730.0.1, Assurance Activities for Digital Electronics for Spacecraft, 
Instruments, and Launch Vehicles.
– Establishes guidelines for assurance personnel to monitor FPGA design and development activities.
• 500-PG-8700.2.8-A, FPGA Development Methodology.
– Describes procedures and guidelines governing the creation of a robust flight FPGA development 
process.
– Includes process review checklists.
• 500-PG-8700.2.7B, Design of Space Flight FPGAs.
– Collection of best design practices for FPGA devices used for space flight designs. 
– Includes a design review checklist.
• NASA PLD Handbook NASA-HDBK-4008 - 12/02/2013
– https://standards.nasa.gov/documents/viewdoc/3315901/3315901
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Presented by Marco Figueiredo at the the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and the Military and Aerospace Programmable 
Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 19-22, 2014 and published on nepp.nasa.gov.
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PLD: Programmable Logic Device
Requires update!
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Conventional NASA Mission Requirements Verification
• FPGA Requirements Verification Matrix (RVM) should be created to list 
all requirements with their identification number and qualify them 
according to: 
– Verification type (Simulation, Analysis, Inspection or Test)
– Verification level (HDL, Card, Box, Instrument, Spacecraft)
– Verification unit (simulation test-bench, prototype or Engineering Design Unit (EDU), 
proto-flight or Engineering Test Unit (ETU), or Flight Unit (FU)). 
• The verification type should be followed by a reference to where the 
verification can be found.
• Test environment should address the TEST AS YOU FLY, FLY AS YOU 
TEST philosophy.
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Presented by Marco Figueiredo at the the Single Event Effects (SEE) Symposium and the Military and Aerospace Programmable 
Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop, La Jolla, CA, May 19-22, 2014 and published on nepp.nasa.gov.
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GOMAT incorporates these procedures with additional assurance for 
Trust and Security. 
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GOMAT is Supplemental To Conventional Reviews
• Conventional design review will evaluate fulfillment of mission requirements and general design 
quality. GOMAT review team takes assurance activity for Security and Trust further. 
• Acquisition and access are assessed:
– V&V performed by the target group:
• EDA tools used are investigated.
• Determine coverage.
• Analyze simulation waveforms.
• Evaluate tool report outputs.
• Any lack in coverage is considered a risk/gap.
• Parametric evaluations beyond normal scope.
– FPGA configuration management and security monitoring.
– Design environment (electronics/IT … storage and transfer).
– Radiation effects as an adversary.
– Personnel vetting.
– IP Core Vetting.
– Strict best practices (bad designs leave back doors for bad actors).
– Assessments are conducted and further V&V is considered if necessary and able.
19
Access
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FASTIME Review Process: Use of An Assurance Checklist
• Derived from NASA design review checklist and information gathered from partnering 
organizations.
• Assessments are divided into subcategories with associated risks.
• Links to previously assessed items are included (do not want to spend time on vetted 
items if its listed risk-level is acceptable).
• New column is added to link to Guidelines and Requirements.
20
n (example section for component V&V) Comments Guidelines/Require
ments Link
Risk Metric
N.1 List component links to component implementation TAGn0
N.2 List component V&V links to component test plan and verification modules TAGn1
N.3 Reported coverage Links coverage reports TAGn2
N.4
Assess coverage (are coverage numbers accurate, files verified)
Traceability!!!!
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Example: FPGA Security Features Subsection
3 FPGA Security Features Comments Guidelines/Requ
irements Link
Risk 
Metric
3.1 Does FPGA require a Key? A key is required. Requirement ##.##
3.2
If a Key is required, what type of Key is being 
implemented (e.g.: embedded PUF, soft PUF , 
stored Key, components (memory versus 
ring oscillator); 
links to datasheet:
Embedded PUF – ring 
oscillator.
3.3
Provide link to Key implementation radiation 
results (Single event effects, total dose, and 
prompt dose); 
No radiation data is 
available 
3.4
Assess functional coverage of 
implementation. Is there potential for lockout 
due to Key access failure ? Example of 
failure can be due to radiation effects, 
adversary learning, or gaps in mitigation.
No tests have been 
performed to determine 
lockout threat
3.5 If no lockout, show proof.
PUF: Physical unclonable function
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GOMAT:
Risk Assessment
Guidelines 
Documents
Review
Process
Threat Matrix
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RISK ASSESSMENT
Product 
Requirements
GOAL
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Conventional depiction of failure rate for a 
complex system.
Independent events
Weibull Failure Rate (λ(T)) Bathtub Curve 
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Additional Modes of Failure Are Included in The 
Failure Rate Analysis When Analyzing Threat Space
• We denote adversary access as mitigation failure.
• Two major concerns:
– Probability of access and
– Outcome of access.
• Probability of Access: access is most likely not a constant failure rate (failure is not 
random – it is forced).
– There is a learning process with a calculated plan.
– Failure rate increases over time due to the adversary getting smarter.
– Some people assume Bayesian is the answer.
• Outcome: Not all mitigation failures are detrimental – e.g., 
– Multilayer mitigation forces the adversary to learn more. 
– Length of access time could be longer than deployment time,
– Inability for the adversary to act upon access, or
– Adversary action is insignificant to system behavior.
24
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But before We Jump The Gun…
• Sometimes simply identifying critical gaps can be sufficient for risk analysis.
• No need for complex probability analysis.
• However, it is critical to understand the conditional dependencies of potential 
adversary access.
• Challenge: there are little data on adversary learning:
– They can either learn how to make a gap in the mitigation or
– They can learn how to find an existing gap.
• Best to overestimate potential of the adversary.  However, be careful, this can 
cause:
– Overdesign (cost, area, power),
– Risk is increased because of complexity – poorly implemented mitigation and potential for lock 
out.
• Always take into account multiple layers of mitigation.
25
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Multilayered Mitigation: Simple Example
• Every gap must be learned by the 
adversary.
• Some gaps are blatant and some require 
extensive learning. 
• Multilayered mitigation has conditional 
probabilities.
• If there is only way to gain access to Gap 
B – what are all the paths that can reach 
Gap B?
• Probability of infiltration (GAP B) given 
Gap A has been infiltrated (P(B|Ai)) is 
based off of learning and increases over 
time.
26
ACCESS
Must understand all GAP Ai 
probabilities
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) =  �𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) ∗ 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
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Determining Gap Probabilities: State-space Coverage As It 
Pertains to Risk
• The goal of coverage for trust is to find all vulnerabilities (that are not physical).
• State-space coverage:
– Simulation,
– Emulation,
– Formal methods,
– Static methods.
• Cannot simply depend on coverage statistics:
– 80% of what is covered?
– What if the most crucial portion is not covered?
• Important to understand EDA tool engines – their benefits and their inadequacies. 
• Lack of coverage insinuates potential gaps. Gap risk depends on:
– Accessibility and Outcome
– Not just coverage. 
27
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Bayesian Methods: Monte Carlo, Game Theory, or 
Markov Chain Analysis
• When does it make sense?
– Determining the best mitigation strategy or 
– If a failure occurred, trying to predict the path of entry (access).
– You’re looking backwards.
• Problem –
– Usually based off of very little information.
– Assumptions are made.
– One wrong assumption can drastically throw off the analysis and result in extremely bad conclusions. 
• Benefit –
– Can get a conclusion without data (hopefully it is reliable).
– Exhaustive assumptions and state analysis can paint a fairly good picture of threat path potential.
– Software is available!!!!!!!!
• Markov Chain modeling can be used as Bayesian or classical.  We will assume classical 
usage when determining risk factors for the checklist.
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FASTIME Strengths
• Differentiation between user flow and assessor flow:
– Guidelines and requirements are provided to the target team and are used as references for the 
review process (what should be done).
– Actual implementation is reviewed.
• Framework takes into account:
– Observed gaps.
– Potential gaps (unobtainable information, lack in V&V coverage, not vetted personnel).
– Multiple layers of mitigation (co-dependencies).
– Potential for adversary’s learning process as it pertains to the actual implementation of mitigation.
– Full ecosystem (personnel, IT, tools, design process, data handling, etc,…)
• Risk analysis is robust:
– Includes V&V coverage… coverage is not the only element that defines risk.
– Risk metrics are more than colors or simple strength descriptions.
– Risk metrics are based on time-to-infiltration and weighted outcome.
– Risk items can be red-lined for immediate attention.
• Eventual integration with model based system engineering tools.
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Vulnerabilities are determined by coverage of guidance, requirements, and implementation discrepancies.
V&V: Verification and Validation
